Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? The definition of “grue” is: x is grue iff it is first observed before t and is green, or else first observed after t and is blue [^2] (74). And that means they’ll be blue! ( Log Out / Each newly observed instance of an A as a B (and assuming that no A has been observed as not B) confirms a hypothesis, viz. But what is it about “green”, rather than “grue”, that allows it to legitimately figure in our inductive inferences? And what makes they conform to valid canons of induction; and the canons are valid iff they What the competing hypotheses “all emeralds are grue” and “all emeralds are green” show us is that this way of thinking about projection into the future is wrong – that this is an inadequate way to explain how we form beliefs about unobserved cases. I can believe that A caused B and form the inductive hypothesis that: all As are Bs. We are often mistaken as to the contents of our perceptions. The traditional view of induction works like this. This worry is not devastating. But we cannot just see that something is grue, because we must also know t and where we are in relation to it. Without a concept of causation, I cannot experience a causal relation between A and B and will not come to believe or hypothesize that all As are Bs. Naturally existing in the world are green things, even if there is no one in the world to observe it. If we have a concept of causation, then we can believe two things to be connected causally and apply the concept to the situation. This will be discussed later. But in addition to this, I submit that you also, (or have some perceptual awareness of the fire boiling the water. Goodman discusses a number of attempts to formulate canons off inductive inference in �3. spurious questions about induction.” (64). A lawlike inductive hypothesis is confirmed by its positive instances [^5]; a coincidental inductive hypothesis is not confirmed by its positive instances. When we say X is grue, we say that X belongs to the set of grue things. That is, you have perceptual awareness of the causal relation between the fire and the boiling water. confirmed by their instances. Subsequently, I will dismiss those concerns and argue that Goodmanized predicates are just as legitimate as normal predicates. After. Moreover, while grue is admittedly an artificial term, that does not mean that it is illegitimate to predicate it of natural objects. A lawlike inductive hypothesis is confirmed by its positive instances [^5]; a coincidental inductive hypothesis is not confirmed by its positive instances. Consider how you acquired a concept of a chair. The problem Consider the set of green things. is a virtuous one. them good seems, intuitively, to be that the conclusions of arguments of this form are Because of this, we cannot legitimately predicate “grue” of emeralds. . both that the next emerald to be observed will be green, and that it will be blue. One says that all emeralds are green and the other says that all emeralds are grue, where grue is said to apply to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue (Goodman 10). Let’s return to our consideration of the grue and green emeralds. Now consider the set of grue things, e.g. Suppose, is 7/2/17. Why the assumption of the uniformity of nature seems only to make the problem find some relevant difference between the two arguments. You first saw the chair, and then you abstracted from it. I will conclude by discussing what Goodmanized predicates reveal about how we acquire beliefs about the unobserved. But if all emeralds are grue, then the first emeralds to be mined in \(2050\) will be grue. Objects that are grue before. He thinks that we can say the same thing about the justification of induction: “All this applies equally well to induction. I will try to show that we can have a perceptual experience of a causal relation. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide, This PDF is available to Subscribers Only. If all we do is infer from particular instances to general claims, then we have equal evidence for two competing hypotheses [^3], . The But the time of first observation is something entirely coincidental. Lawlike hypotheses involve only projectible predicates, and projectibility, in turn, is determined by entrenchment. Let’s return to our consideration of the grue and green emeralds. We can’t see anything about t in the emerald. accepted deductive practice. But there is not. Search for other works by this author on: © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly. can now see that ‘green’ is also definable in terms of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’: something is green if and the pot, the fire) isolated from one another, you see the elements interacting. But when I look at a grue emerald, I do not believe that something caused it to be grue. but to differences between the properties of being grue and being green. If we form beliefs about unobserved events based solely on the flat-footed understanding of induction (marked []), then we couldn’t have the belief that emeralds observed after t are going to be green (but we do), because there is an equally well-supported competing hypothesis. ...This looks flagrantly circular ...But this circle justified by being brought into agreement with each other.”. we have only two options: (i) say that there is also something wrong with the inductive Here’s the thought. Presumably, the rules of induction are what enable us to project into the future – that is, to be able to make accurate predictions with regard to each subsequent, unobserved instance. Every emerald, then, is green. Every emerald observed so far has been green. . Again, this seems like a perfectly comprehensible, if unusual, definition. But if “grue” is not a legitimate predicate, then the mystery disappears. A reason to be dissatisfied with an explanation of justification in terms of accepted that all emeralds are green and that all emeralds are grue. I can believe that A caused B and form the inductive hypothesis that: all As are Bs. in the emerald. Now that we have preserved the legitimacy of Goodmanized predicates, we can ask what they reveal about how we come to get the beliefs we have about the unobserved. ( Log Out / You don’t just see the individual elements (. How did we acquire it [^6], ? It is natural to respond to this puzzle by claiming that something must be wrong with the word
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